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Abstract:   This paper examines the role of liability for past environmental contamination in th e
privat ization  processes of Central and Eastern Europe.  The theoretical section establishes a lin k
between  a  risk-averse investor’s amount of information regarding the extent of past environmental
c ontamination (and its cleanup costs) and the inv estor’s willingness to pay for a particular enterprise,
i .e., bid.  As the investor obtai ns a more precise estimate of the uncertain cleanup costs, the investor
faces  less r isk; therefore, the investor’s risk premium falls and the investor’s bid rises.  This lin k
g enerates four hypothe ses regarding a privatization agency’s responses to the investor’s knowledge
of  cleanu p costs.  The empirical section of this paper proposes to test these hypotheses wit h
forthcoming analysis using data from the Czech Republic.
_______________________
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Economics Association (ALEA) meetings.   Needless to say, all errors remain my responsibility.Non-technical Summary
Under the former communist regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe, economic
activities severely degraded the region’s environment.  Various types of economic
facilities severely contaminated the air, water, and soil surrounding their sites by emitting
and dumping numerous pollutants.  Therefore, most commercial and industrial sites in
Central and Eastern Europe are presently contaminated, if not severely so.  Such
contamination was widely reported shortly after the communist regimes fell.
Strangely enough, privatization agencies in Central and Eastern Europe
responsible for the transfer of ownership over these facilities were taken aback by
investors’ concerns over the liability for any remediation of this widespread and severe
contamination.  Foreign investors were especially concerned by the potential liability for
two reasons.  First, they correctly believed that governments wished to tap the foreign
investors’ “deep pockets” for financing the cleanup of this large-scale degradation.
Second, foreign investors recalled their previous experiences in Western industrialized
economies over retroactive liability for environmental contamination, such as Superfund
liability for hazardous waste contamination in the United States.
After acknowledging the investors’ concerns, privatization agencies responded
with policies to reallocate liability for the cleanup costs.  First, they responded with price
reduction policies, but only on an ad hoc basis.  Later, privatization agencies in some
countries developed more systematic and thoughtful policies, such as indemnification of
private liability using reimbursement schemes.  Moreover, governments decided to gather
more complete information on cleanup decisions before rushing into compensation
schemes.
These government policy decisions were designed to facilitate the privatization
process and presumably to increase the sales revenues generated by direct sales, auctions,
and other privatization methods.  Investors facing liability for cleanup costs would be
expected to discount their bid for a contaminated enterprise commensurate with the
extent of required cleanup.  Of course, investors did not understand the extent of
contamination and therefore cleanup costs with perfect certainty.  Instead, most investors
understood the level of cleanup costs with great uncertainty.  As long as investors are
risk-averse, the existence of uncertainty (i.e., risk), will prompt them to seek a risk
premium to compensate them for bearing this risk.  This risk premium drives down the
investor’s bid for a contaminated enterprise.  Therefore, an inverse relationship exists
between the precision of the investor’s estimation of cleanup costs (i.e., information
about cleanup costs) and the investor’s bid.  Given this connection, privatization agencies
should be expected to offer greater compensation to investors in the form of price
discounts when the investor’s estimation of cleanup costs is imprecise.  This logic
generates the first of four testable hypotheses: when the state offers only price discounts
without indemnification, the degree of price discount is inversely related to the amount of
information known by the investor.
This logic extends to the policy of offering compensation in the form of
indemnification from private liability (e.g., reimbursement for cleanup costs).  Of course,
in this case the state bears the indemnified cleanup costs.  In addition, the state faces
other expenses associated with indemnification.  These expenses may include
administrative expenses for operating any reimbursement program.  They also mayinclude costs claimed as past environmental contamination by the investor yet generated
after privatization.  This possibility is quite feasible since it may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to separate past and current environmental contamination.  Less obviously,
indemnification may generate higher future cleanup costs by undermining the polluter
pays principle and degrading deterrence of future contaminating activities.
Given these additional indemnification expenses, the inverse relationship between
the investor’s amount of information and his/her bid drives the choice between zero and
full indemnification and the choice of partial indemnification.  When the state is deciding
between zero and full indemnification, it is more likely to offer full indemnification as
the investor’s information degrades because the risk premium is more likely to exceed the
administrative expenses associated with indemnification.  The opposite result follows as
the investor’s information improves: the state is more likely to offer zero indemnification.
These predictions represent two additional testable hypotheses.  Finally, consider the case
where the state is selecting any level of indemnification (including zero, partial, and full).
In this scenario, indemnification lowers the investor’s risk premium similar to
information because indemnification limits the scope of the investor’s liability.  Yet,
these two factors are assumed to be complements; that is, indemnification reduces the
investor’s risk more when he/she possess poor information about cleanup costs.  Given
this relationship, the state raises the level of indemnification as the investor’s information
degrades because indemnification becomes a stronger tool for lowering the investor’s risk
premium.  This prediction represents the final testable hypothesis.
The empirical section of this paper proposes to test all the noted hypotheses with
forthcoming analysis of the privatization process in the Czech Republic.
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1. Introduction
U nder the former communist regimes  in the Central and Eastern Europe, economic activities
severely   degraded the environment throughout the region.  Various types of economic facilities —
i ndustry, agriculture, military operations — severely contaminated the  air, water, and soil surrounding
t heir sites by emitting and dumping numero us pollutants.  Therefore, most commercial and industrial
sites  in  Central and Eastern Europe are presently contaminated, if not severely so.  Suc h
contamination was widely reported shortly after the communist regimes fell.
Strangely  enough, privatization agencies in  Central and Eastern Europe responsible for the
t ransfer of own ership over these facilities were taken aback by investors’ concerns over the liability
f or any remediation of this  widespread and severe contamination.  Foreign investors were especially
c oncerned by the  potential liability for two reasons.  First, they correctly believed that governments
wished  to  tap the foreign investors’ “deep pockets” for financing the cleanup of this large-scal e
de gradation  (Goldenman, 1995).  Second, foreign investors recalled their previous experiences i n
W estern industrialized economie s over retroactive liability for environmental contamination, such as
Superfu nd  liability for hazardous waste contamination in the United States (World Bank/OECD ,
1992).
A fter acknowledging the  investors’ concerns, privatization agencies responded with policies
to   reallocate liability for the cleanup costs.  First, they responded with price reduction policies, but
o nly on an ad hoc basis .  Later, privatization agencies in some countries developed more systematic
and  thoughtful policies, such as indemnification of private liability using reimbursement scheme s
(Kru ž íková  and Drobnik, 1993).  Moreover, governments decided to gather more complet e
information on cleanup decisions before rushing into compensation schemes.2
T hese gove rnment policy decisions were designed to facilitate the privatization process and
p resumably to increase the sales revenu es generated by direct sales, auctions, and other privatization
methods.   Investors facing liability for cleanup costs would be expected to discount their bid for  a
c ontaminated enterprise commensurate with the  extent of required cleanup.  Of course, investors did
not  unde rstand the extent of contamination and therefore cleanup costs with perfect certainty .
Ins tead,  most investors understood the level of cleanup costs with great uncertainty.  As long a s
inves tors  are risk-averse, the existence of uncertainty (i.e., risk), will prompt them to seek a ris k
p remium to compensate them for bearing this ris k.  This risk premium drives down the investor’s bid
f or a contaminated enterprise.   Therefore, an inverse relationship exists between the precision of the
investor’s  estimation of cleanup costs and the investor’s bid.  Given this connection, privatizatio n
a gencies should be expected to offer greater compensation to investo rs, in the form of price discounts
and  indem nification from private liability (e.g., reimbursement for cleanup costs).  From thi s
c onnection, the theoretical section of the paper generates four hypotheses,  which the empirical section
proposes to test with forthcoming analysis of the privatization process in the Czech Republic.
2.  Environmental Liabilities
2.1. Details
P rivatization involves t he transfer of ownership and control over assets from the state to the
private  sector.  In Central and Eastern Europe, as in other industrialized countries, generally thi s
p rocess transfers  all  assets and liabilities to the new owner , unless the two contracting parties provide
other  arrangements, a rule called successor liability (Goldenman, 1995).   Although most countries
do  not exp licitly specify environmental liabilities in their laws, some countries, such as the Czec h
Re public,  have explicitly stated this policy.  For clarification, environmental liabilities fall into tw o  See Boyd (1996) for an excellent analysis of how these two types of liabilities may be connected.
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broad  categories: (1)  contamination caused by current operations and (2) contamination stemming
f rom past operation s (i.e., preceding privatization).  This analysis focuses exclusively on the second
type  of liability, commonly called past environmental damage (PED).   This  type of environmental
1
contamination divides into four categories (Goldenman, 1995):
(1) on-site environmental contamination (e.g., soil contamination),
(2) off-site environmental contamination (e.g., groundwater aquifer contamination),
(3) injuries and illnesses suffered by employees of a facility, and
(4) damages to third parties (e.g., health problems born by neighboring residents).
The  re sponsibility for any or all of these components of past environmental damage may b e
t ransferred to the new owner  of a property (i.e., investor) as a liability.  In other words, the investor
m ust pay for the cleanup of this environmental contamination a nd/or compensate injured workers and
damaged third parties.
Potential  investors in state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern  Europe obviously did
n ot wish to  bear the burden of these liabilities.  In a study of 1,000 large North American and West
European  firms, half of those who evaluated sites in Central and Eastern Europe rejected the m
partia lly  on environmental grounds (The Economist, 1993).  According to a World Bank/OEC D
survey  o f potential investors, liability for past environmental contamination ranked as the mos t
important environmental concern (World Bank/OECD, 1992).
In  re sponse to these concerns, government agencies in Central and Eastern Europe hav e
i mplemented alternative mechanisms of allocating liability for pa st environmental contamination.  One
mechanism  offers a price reduction to  the new owner.  Presumably, this discount is commensurate  Boyd (1994, p. 41) notes this type of investor behavior.
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w ith the anticipated cleanup costs.  With a nother mechanism, the state indemnifies the private owner
fo r  all or part of the cleanup costs related to past environmental contamination, given certai n
r estric tions, such as future compliance with environmental regulations.  In this case, the state bears
al l  or some of the cleanup costs.  Regardless of the level of indemnification, the government ma y
c hoose to perform the remediation itself  or simply reimburse the investor for its cleanup costs.  With
a  th ird mechanism, the state sets aside a portion of the sales revenues generated by a specifi c
enter prise  and earmarks these funds for reimbursement of cleanup costs born by the new owner .
These arrangements are generally called escrow accounts.
2.2. Theoretical Representation
I n all cases except  full indemnification, the investor is left to face an uncertain liability.  This
uncertaint y  then prompts a risk-averse investor to alter its bid for any enterprise suspected o f
conta mination.   A risk-neutral investor reduces its bid by the expected liability costs.  However,  a
r isk-averse investor reduces its bid by this amount plus a  risk premium.   In order to attract investors,
2
p rivatization agencies presumably must respond to thi s risk-averse behavior, regardless of the chosen
re-allocation mechanism or compensation scheme.
T he follo wing three sections model formally this effect of risk-aversion on an investor’s bid
i n the face of uncertain cleanup cost s.  The first of these sections displays how a risk-averse investor
d ecreases its willingness-to-pay for an enterprise or increa ses its desire for compensation when facing
uncertainty   by including a risk premium in its bid.  More important, this section highlights th e
importance  of investor information about uncertain liability costs.  As an investor gains greate r
in formation  on these uncertain costs (i.e., as his/her cost estimate becomes more precise), the ris k5
associated  with this liability declines.  Consequently, a better informed investor requires les s
c ompensation because  it involves a smaller risk premium.  Since all liability mechanisms, except full
in demnification,  involve this uncertainty and thus generate a risk premium, choices over thes e
m echanisms  made by government agencies should reflect this relationship between information and
the level of risk premium.
The  following three sections develop three models to capture the choice of liability re -
a llocation  mechanism and the parameters of each mechanism.  The first model concerns the case of
complet e  uncertainty regarding liability costs, where the state imposes all liability on the privat e
investor  yet compensates the investor with a price reduction.  The second model considers th e
d ichot omy between complete uncertainty and complete certainty, where the state chooses between
imposin g  full liability on the private investor and fully indemnifying the investor.  The third mode l
g eneralizes the first two models by adding the possi bility for the state to offer partial indemnification.
F rom these three models, theory generates four hypotheses, which fo rthcoming empirical analysis will
test.
3. Complete Uncertainty and Price Reduction
Im agine  that a risk-averse investor wishes to purchase a currently state-owned enterprise.  
Prior to this potential purchase, the investor has an initial level of wealth, W:
W = initial level of investor wealth.
  Disregarding any possible environment al liabilities, the investor knows with certainty the underlying
value of the enterprise, based on the present value of the future profit stream, denoted N,
N = present value of the enterprise’s future profit stream.
The  investor correctly believes that  it is responsible for all liabilities associated with the enterprise,6
i ncluding environmental liabilities.  Ho wever, the investor only imperfectly understands the extent of
contamination   at the facility and thus imperfectly observes the present value of the cleanup costs ,
denoted as C,
C = level of cleanup costs.
Ins tead,  the investor knows only the distribution of these costs.  More important, the subjectiv e
d istribution depends on the amount of information about cleanup costs known  by the investor.  Define
I as the metric that captures the amount of information:
I = metric for information about cleanup costs known by the investor,
so  that I  increases as information improves.  Given this definition, costs are randomly distribute d
according to the probability distribution function f(C|I) along the following interval:
C  0 [C ,C ]. min max
As   the information metric increases, probability mass shifts towards the mean or expected value of
the distribution,  ￿,
￿ = mean or expected level of cleanup costs,
a s shown in Figure 1.  It is assumed that information has an unbiased ef fect on the investor’s expected
v alue of cleanup cos ts; i.e.,  ￿ is independent of I.  Information instead sharpens the precision of the
i nvestor’s calculation of cleanup costs.  Put differen tly, increased information reduces the uncertainty
o f cleanup costs.  In mathematical terms, a distribution invo lving greater information, f(C|I N), second-
ord er  stochastically dominates a distribution involving less information, f(C|I O), where I N  >
I O(Rothschild  and Stiglitz, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971).  In other words, f(C|I O) represents   Bluffstone and P anayotou (1998) also examine the effect of information about cleanup costs on an
3
investor’s bidding for a state-owned enterprise.
   Thomas (1994) considers the case of many  risk-neutral investors wishing to purchase a state-owned
4
e nterprise in an auction sett ing.  In this setting, heterogenous information about the net value of the enterprise
c auses the winning bid to fall below the expec ted value of the enterprise.  Nevertheless, each investor observes
its unique level of net value with certainty, unlike the formulation of this paper.
7
a mean-preserving spread of f(C|I N).
3
The  inv estor values its wealth according to a strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenster n
utility function, U( C),
U( C) = investor’s utility function.
Prior to the potential purchase, the investor enjoys a reservation utility level,  ￿,
￿ = U(W) = reservation utility level.
To purchase the enterprise, the investor is willing to pay a maximum price of P,
P = maximum willingness to pay for enterprise,
which is defined more completely below.   After the purchase, the investor has a net wealth, Y,
4
Y = W + N - C - P = net wealth after purchase.
The investor is assumed to maximize its expected utility from the purchase, EU,
EU(Y|I) =  I  U(Y) f(C|I) dC = expected utility from the purchase of the enterprise. C
Next  c onsider the role of the privatization agency.  It seeks to sell the enterprise to th e
investor.   In this effort, it seeks to maximize its own-country welfare, represented  by net revenues
fro m  the sale of the enterprise.  The investor’s underlying valuation of the enterprise and th e
subjective  distribution of cleanup costs is common knowledge.  In addition, the agency  knows the
investor’s  util ity function.  In this case, the agency can extract all the rents from the investor b y
forcin g  the investor to pay a price so high that the investor only enjoys an expected utility exactl y   This assumption is not critical to the final result.   Instead, the final result demands only that the final
5
price paid depends positively on the investor’s maximum price (i.e., willingness-to-pay).
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equal to its reservation utility:
EU(W+N-C-P) =  I  U(W+N-C-P) f(C|I) dC =  ￿. C
This   equality constraint defines P, the investor’s maximum willingness to pay for the enterprise.
5
N ote that expected utility cannot fall below  ￿, otherwise the investor  will not purchase the enterprise.
T o capture the  investor’s behavior under uncertainty, the certainty equivalent of purchasing
the enterprise with its uncertain cleanup costs is structured in the following way:
U(W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I)]-P|I) = EU(W+N-C-P|I),
where  information, I, is fixed at a certain  level.  In other words, the investor is indifferent between
a ccepting the outcome W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I)]-P with certaint y and the outcome W+N-C-P with uncertainty.
T he variable  ð (I) is positive, since the investor  is risk-averse, and depends on I, since EU depends on
I.  It also represents the risk premium associated with the uncertain purchase,
ð (I) = risk premium associated with uncertain purchase.
The  r isk premium is the difference between the expected level of net wealth and the certaint y
equivalent of the uncertain purchase:
ð (I) = E(W+N-C-P|I) - {W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I)]-P} = (W+N- ￿-P) - {W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I)]-P},
for a given level of I.
N ow consider the effect of cl eanup costs and uncertainty on the investor’s bidding behavior.
When  no cleanup costs are born or the distribution collapses all its probability mass at C=0, th e
i nvestor’s bid equals the un derlying value of the enterprise: P = N.  When cleanup costs are positive
but  certa in at their mean,  ￿, the investor sets its bid at P = N -  ￿.  When cleanup costs becom e   This analysis is similar to previous research on the effect of ri sk on utility that began with Rothschild
6
and Stiglitz (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971).
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uncertain, use of the certainty equivalent identifies the investor’s bid in the following way:
U(W) =  ￿ = EU(W+N-C-P|I) = U(W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I)]-P|I).
T he equality of the two endpoints of this equation indicate  that P = N -  ￿ - ð (I); i.e., the investor pads
his/her bid with a risk premium, which depends on the investor’s information on cleanup costs.
S ince information reduces th e uncertainty of cleanup costs (i.e., increase the precision of the
i nvesto r’s cost estimate), it must reduce the investor’s risk premium:  [d ð (I) / dI] < 0.  Conversely,
ð (I)  r ises as I falls.  Therefore, P falls as I degrades.  To prove this point, fix P at P* = N -  ￿, th e
correct  level when c osts are certain.  At this level P*, when C is uncertain,  ð (I) > 0 and EU <  ￿.
Even   though the latter condition holds, the theory can employ the assumption of second-orde r
sto chastic  dominance and the definition of certainty equivalent to prove the inverse relationshi p
between  ð (I) and I.  Let I N > I O, then the following relationships hold:
U(W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I N)]-P*|I N) = EU(I N,P*) > EU(I O,P*) = U(W+N-[ ￿+ ð (I O)]-P*|I O).
T he inner inequality of this equation follo ws directly from the assumption of second-order stochastic
dominan ce.   The left-hand and right-hand equalities follow directly from the definition of certai n
e quivalent.  The two endpoints of the e quation reveal that  ð (I N) <  ð (I O), when I N > I O, since no other
parameters  would permit  the inequality.   Therefore,  ð (I) rises and P falls as information degrades.
6
F inally, note tha t the investor must adjust its bid down from P* = N -  ￿ to P = N -  ￿ -  ð (I) in order
to achieve its reservation utility,  ￿.
A s long as the investor is liable for cleanup c osts, the investor’s concern about cleanup costs,
including   any uncertainty, becomes the agency’s concern.  In order to attract investors, the agency10
m ust  accommodate the investors’ expected cleanup costs and the risk premium stemming from the
u ncertain cleanup costs.  Thi s accommodation comes in the form of price reductions.  Since the risk
p remium depends negatively on investor information about clea nup costs, this model predicts that the
price  paid by  an investor falls (the price reduction rises) as information degrades, which represents
the first testable hypothesis.
H ypothesis # 1:  The price reduction  offered by a privatization agency to an investor rises as
the investor’s information on cleanup costs degrades.
For thcoming  empirical analysis will test for a systematic negative relationship between investo r
information and price reductions.
This  mod el considers the scenario where the investor faces all of the liability and th e
g overnment offers p rice reductions as compensation.  The next model considers the scenario where
t he government may additionally choose to accept all of the  liability, that is, completely indemnify the
inves tor  of private liability.  This liability re-allocation mechanism may be quite attractive to th e
privatization  agency since price discounts reduce sales  revenues, including discounts linked to risk
premiums.
4.  No Indemnification versus Complete Indemnification
As  a nice contrast to the previous model, consider the case where the privatization agenc y
c hooses between  no indemnification, while offering a price discount, and complete indemnification,
w ithout any price discount .  Given the first policy option, the investor faces all of the risk generated
by  uncertain cleanup costs and requires a risk premium in compensation.   Given the second policy
o ption, the investor faces none of the risk and  requires no risk premium; however, the state bears the
cleanup costs and other costs, such as administrative expenses.  See Boyd (1996) for an excellent discussion on this point.
7
  See Boyd (1996) for an excellent discussion on this point.
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When   the state considers indemnification as a policy option, its own-country welfare mus t
i nclude the costs associated with indemnification.   Assume that the cleanup costs, C, are independent
of  who pays them.  In addition to cleanup costs, the state faces other expenses associated wit h
indemnification, denoted as K,
K = indemnification expenses.
T hese expenses may include administrative expenses for operating any re imbursement program.  They
also  ma y include costs claimed as  past  environmental contamination by the investor yet generate d
after  privatization.  This possibility is quite feasible  since it may be very difficult, if not impossible,
to  separate past and current environmental contamination, which causes a moral hazard problem.
7
L ess obviously, indemnification may generate higher future cl eanup costs by undermining the polluter
pays principle and degrading deterrence of future contaminating activities.
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T he agency chooses between zero and comp lete indemnification.  Let m represent the choice
t o indemnify completely, m = 1, or not to inde mnify, m = 0: m  0 {0,1}.  The agency’s sales revenues
n et of state-born cleanup costs a nd indemnification expenses are denoted as R, which depend on the
indemnification choice:
R(m) = P - mC - mK = agency’s net revenues.
I n this case, the  agency may face uncertain cleanup costs.  The agency is assumed to be risk neutral
a nd chooses to maximize the ex pected value of R.  When the state offers no indemnification and the
investor  fac es the risk, the bid price is P(m=0) = N -  ￿ -  ð (I) and the agency’s net revenues ar e
R (m=0) = N -  ￿ -  ð (I).  When the state offers complete indemnification  and the investor faces no risk,12
the bid price is P(m=1) = N and the agency’s expected net revenues are R(m=1) = N -  ￿ - K.
T he state selects c omplete indemnification when R(m=1) > R(m=0), which implies it selects
m  = 1 when K <  ð (I).  As the  investor’s information on cleanup costs falls, the risk premium climbs;
therefore,   the likelihood of selecting indemnification rises.  The contrary result follows whe n
information improves.  These results represent two hypotheses.
Hypothe sis  # 2:  As the investor’s information on cleanup costs falls, the likelihood of th e
privatization agency offering indemnification rises.
Hypothesis # 3:  As information improves, the likelihood of offering a price discount rises.
Forthcoming empirical analysis will test these hypotheses.
The  next theoretical section generalizes the indemnification policy option and generates  a
fourth and related hypothesis.
5. Degree of Partial Indemnification
Th e  final model generalizes the two previous models by including partial indemnification ,
while retaining the policy options of zero or full indemnification and a price discount.
In  this general model, the privatization agency is able to offer any level of indemnificatio n
b etween none and full: m  0 [0,1].  As the level of  indemnification rises, the cleanup costs born by the
s tate, mC, rise, as do the state’s indemnific ation expenses, mK.  As the level of indemnification rises,
t he cleanup costs b orn by the investor, (1-m)C, fall, as does the expected level of cleanup costs, (1-
m ) ￿, as shown in Figure 2.  In response , the investor raises its bid price due to these lower expected
costs.
G reater indemnification also generat es second-order stochastic dominance, which lowers the
risk  premium, prompting the investor to raise its bid price.  If m N> m O, the distribution f(C|I,m N)   A s imple example illustrates the mean-preserving adjustment and residual second-order stochastic
9
d ominance.  Assume tha t cleanup costs are uniformly distributed over the interval [100,1000].  Consider two
leve ls  of indemnification: m N = 50 % and m O = 25 %.  Before adjustment, the 50%-indemnification polic y
g enerates an expected level of 275 and a post-indemnification int erval of [50,500] and the 25%-indemnification
policy  ge nerates an expected level of 412.5 and a post-indemnification interval of [75,750].  The shif t
p arameter necessary to preserve the means between th e two distributions is 137.5.  After adjustment, the 50%-
indemnification  policy generates a post-indemnification interval of [187.5,  637.5], which obviously second-
order stochastically dominates the 25%-indemnification interval of [75,750].
13
s eco nd-order stochastically dominates the distribution f(C|I,m O) because the first distribution more
greatly   reduces the scope of the investor’s exposure to liability than does the second distribution .
Similar  to information, greater indemnification  tightens the investor’s cost estimate, in this case by
r educing the spread between the minimum and maximum values of cleanup costs .  As shown in Figure
2,  ( 1-m N)C  and (1-m N)C  are closer together than are (1-m O)C  and (1-m O)C .  Unlik e min max min max
information, indemnification alters the expected value of cleanup costs.
O f course, second-order  dominance holds even after adjusting for the difference in expected
cleanup costs.  The following equation captures the necessary adjustment:
E[(1-m N)C+z|I,m N] = E[(1-m O)C|I,m O],
w here z represents the shift parameter to preserve the means between  the two distributions associated
with  indemnification levels  m N and m O.  Given this adjustment, second-order stochastic dominance
implies  the following relationship between the two levels of expected utility associated wit h
indemnification levels m N and m O:
I  U(W+N-[(1-m N)C+z]-P) f(C|I,m N) dC >  I  U(W+N-[(1-m O)C]-P) f(C|I,m O) dC , C C
when  m N > m O.  This mean-preserving spread does not alter the  level of expected costs; instead, it
affects only the riskiness associated with the two distributions.
9
T herefore, this constructed second-order stochastic domin ance affects only the investor’s risk   This a ssumption places restrictions on the utility function and permits the existence of an optimal
10
level of indemnification.
  This assumption also places restrictions on the utility function.
11
   Bluffstone and Panayotou (1998) examine the privatization agency’s choice over the level o f
12
i ndemnification, while implicitly considering an investor’s risk  premium.  Yet, their formulation does not reveal
this relationship in a setting similar to this paper’s setting.
14
p remium.  As with information,  greater indemnification reduces the investor’s risk premium,  ð (I,m):
( Mð  /  Mm) < 0.  Moreover, I reasonably assume that indemn ification is less productive at reducing risk
as  the level  rises: ( M ð  /  M m) > 0; i.e., m reduces  ð (I,m) at  a declining rate.   Moreover, I assume that
2 2 10
t he level of indemnification and investor’s information on cleanup co sts act as substitutes for reducing
the risk premium:
[ M ð  / ( Mm MI)] > 0.
2
I n  other words, indemnification becomes less meaningful for reducing risk as the investor becomes
better informed about the cleanup costs.
11 , 12
The investor’s bid price is the following:
P = N - (1-m) ￿ -  ð (I,m).
G reater indemnification reduces the expected level of cleanup co sts, which is reflected in (1-m) ￿, and
l owers the riskiness o f uncertain costs (while adjusting for lower expected costs), which is reflected
in  ð (I,m).  The agency’s expected net revenues are the following:
R(m) = P - m ￿ - mK.
Substituting P into R(m),
R(m) = N - (1-m) ￿ -  ð (I,m) - m ￿ - mK
= N -  ￿ -  ð (I,m) - mK.15
Maximizing  expected net revenues with respect to the  level of m shows that the agency should set
the level of m so that the following relationship holds:
- [ Mð (I,m) /  Mm] = K.
Let m* denote this maximizing level for m.
Since  the  level of indemnification and investor’s information about cleanup costs ar e
substit utes,  m* is inversely related to the level of I.  This result represents the fourth testabl e
hypothesis.
Hypothe sis  # 4:  As the investor becomes better informed about cleanup costs, th e
privatization agency lowers the level of indemnification.  
Forthcoming empirical analysis will test this hypothesis.
Lastly,  this general model formulation includes previous results as  testable hypotheses.  At
high levels of information, the state may optimally choose to offer no indemnification:
- [ Mð (I,m) /  Mm]  # K at m = 0.
At low levels of information, the agency may optimally choose to offer full indemnification:
- [ Mð (I,m) /  Mm]  $ K at m = 1.
6. Empirical Analysis of Testable Hypotheses
6.1. Summary of Hypotheses
I n  sum, the series of three models generates four testable hypotheses.  First, when the state
o ffers only pric e discounts without indemnification, the degree of price discount is inversely related
t o the amount of informat ion known by the investor.  Second (and third), when the state is deciding
between  zero  and full indemnification, it is more likely to offer zero (full) indemnification as th e
amount  of  information rises (falls).  Fourth, when the state is selecting any level of indemnification16
(including  zero, partial, and full),  it raises the level of indemnification as the investor’s information
falls.  The following section proposes how to test empirically these hypotheses.
6.2.  Selection of Czech Republic as Research Site
T o test the above hypotheses, I propose t o examine decisions made by the Czech Ministry of
P rivatization and  its successor, the Czech Ministry of Finance.  Although many countries in Central
and Eastern Europe have responded to investors’ concerns over past environmental contamination
w ith various liability  re-allocation mechanisms, the Czech Republic serves as the best case study for
e mpiric al analysis for two unique reasons.  First, the Czech Republic has compiled meaningful data
o n environmental liabilities because it has re-allocated lia bility in a systematic manner; other countries
h ave resp onded to investors’ concerns in an ad hoc manner (Goldenman, 1995).  Second and more
important,   the Czech government has offered liability re-allocation, in this case reimbursement fo r
cle anup  costs, to both foreign and domestic investors (Goldenman, 1995).  Other nationa l
governments   have offered liability re-allocation only to foreign investors.  Such evidence certainl y
sup ports  the hypotheses since foreigners would most likely represent the least-informed type o f
investor.  Yet, the Czech data allows even stronger evidence to be offered.
6 .3. Privatization, Past Environmental Contamination, and Reim bursement in Czech Republic
G overnment responses to investors’ concerns a bout liability for environmental contamination
at  form erly state-owned enterprises have varied over time in the Czech Republic.  (The appendi x
provides   details on the clarification of liabilities.)  Prior to March 1993, the Czech governmen t
negotiated   responsibility for environmental liabilities on a case-by-case basis.  It offered pric e
discounts  and limited indemnification to certain investors on an ad hoc basis.  Beginning in Marc h
1 993, the Czech government started to addr ess environmental liabilities systematically.  Government17
Resolution  No. 123/1993 established a system for re-allocating liability.  First, it defines pas t
e nvironmental contamination to include only on-site environmental contam ination: soil contamination,
g r oundwater contamination, and hazardous waste dumps.  Second, it prohibits price reductions on
t he basis of environmental cleanup costs.  Third, it author izes the National Property Fund (part of the
M inistry of Finance) to reimburse investors for clean up costs by negotiating individual contracts with
n ew owners.  (The appendix provides greater details on this  fairly complex process.)  Reimbursement
o f cl eanup costs is limited to 100% of the purchase price or the value of the capital stock of a joint
s tock compan y; any costs beyond this limit remain the responsibility of the new owner.  Otherwise,
the  National Property Fund has complete discretion  about entering into environmental agreements
with  new owners.  It is neither obliged to offer  any assistance nor to offer complete assistance if it
of fers  any.  This discretion allows the forthcoming empirical analysis to test the theoretically -
generated hypotheses.
7.  Summary
I n sum, this paper  examines the link between an investor’s information on the extent of past
enviro nmental  contamination (and its related cleanup costs) and government efforts to placate a n
i nvestor’s concerns over liability for this  contamination.  These efforts re-allocate liability using legal
mechanisms  such as price discounts and indemnification.  From this link, the  theoretical section of
t his paper generates four hypo theses, which the empirical section of this paper proposes to test with
f orth coming empirical analysis using data on liability re-allocation decisions in the Czech Republic.18
APPENDIX
To  under stand fully the role of environmental liabilities, this appendix describes the Czec h
p rivatization process, which began in  1990.  The first efforts focused on small enterprises, which did
n ot involve environme ntal liabilities since this privatization did not transfer any types of liabilities to
new  owners.  Re stitution also began in 1990.  As with small enterprises, it apparently does no t
t ransfer environmental liabilities to new owner s (Kru ž íková and Drobnik, 1993).  In 1991, the Czech
g overnment began  to privatize medium and large enterprises.  These transfers were concentrated in
t wo waves of mass privatization involving mostly voucher privat ization.  Privatization of medium and
large enterprises definitely involved environmental liabilities.
A lthou gh Czech laws do not establish a specific obligation to remediate past environmental
conta mination,  they do establish general obligations to remediate contamination.  Severa l
env ironmental  laws contain provisions addressing the obligation to remediate environmenta l
contamina tion  when required by an environmental authority (Goldenman, 1995).  Thes e
e nvironmental  laws concern on-site and off-site environmental contamination.  Other laws speak to
o ther types of liabilitie s.  Under Czech labor laws, a firm is liable for employees’ injuries or illnesses
s ustained during thei r employment if the damage was caused by a violation of some legal obligation
( Goldenman, 1995) .  Under the Czech civil code, companies are responsible for damages caused to
t hi rd parties if the harmful activity violated a Czech law before January 1, 1992; after this date, the
firm   is liable for all damages regardless of the presence or absence of violations (Kru ž íková an d
Drobnik, 1993).
The  1991  Large-Scale Privatization Act clearly states that the new owner of a privatize d
enter prise  acquires all assets and  liabilities .  A later amendment explicitly noted environmenta l19
liabili ties.   To clarify these liabilities, a 1992 amendment to the original act requires that al l
p rivatization projects submitted  after February 29, 1992, must include an environmental audit which
assesses  the environmental liabilities of the specific enterprise, in addition to providing  a record of
previou s  violations and documenting the degree of noncompliance with current environmenta l
regulations.   Later in May 1992, the Czech Ministry of Privatization and the Czech Ministry o f
E nvironment jointly issued “Guidelines for Envir onmental Assessment”, which provide directions for
assessment of on-site contamination — with a focus on soil and groundwater contamination.
This  appendix also describes the reimbursement  process at the National Property Fund.  In
o rder to receive reimburs ement from the National Property Fund, the following procedures must be
fo llowed.   First, the new owner must perform an environmental audit and obtain approval of tha t
a udit from the Ministr y of Environment (Goldenman, 1995).  After receiving this approval, the new
o wner may apply for reimbursement through an enviro nmental agreement with the National Property
Fund,  which forwards the application to the Ministry of Environment and  the Ministry of Finance.
If  these mi nistries agree that a reimbursement contract is worthwhile, the National Property Fun d
negotiates  a contact with the new owner.  After signing the agreement with the National Propert y
F und, the new owner must provide a risk assessment in comp liance with Government Resolution No.
39 3/1994.   Based on this risk assessment, the Czech Inspection of the Environment (part of th e
M inistry of Environment) determines whether or not remediation is ne cessary; if necessary, it imposes
a gainst the new owner a remediation order, which iden tifies the acceptable standards to be met in the
r emediation work.  After rec eiving this administrative order, the new owner must complete a tender
pro cess  for a remediation program that obtains the required environmental standards.  Finally, th e
environment al  contract for reimbursement must be approved by the Czech government when i t20
decides on the specific privatization project (Goldenman, 1995).
Severa l  enterprises and investors have participated in this process.  By May 1996, Czec h
i nv estors had performed over 4,000 environmental audits, implemented over 200 risk assessments,
and received over 104 environmental agreements, valued at CZK 102 billion ($ 3.75 billion).21
REFERENCES
B lu ffstone, Randall and Theodore Panayotou (1998), “Environmental Liability and Privatization in
C entral and Eastern Europe:  Toward an Optimal Policy,” Harvard Institute for International
Development (HIID) working paper, Harvard University.
Boyd,  Ja mes (1996), “Environmental Liability Reform and Privatization in Central and Easter n
Europe,”  European Journal of Law and Economics , v. 3, n. 1, pg. 39-60.
The Economist (1993), “Environmental Liabilities: Dirty Legacy,” September 18, 1993.
K ru ž íková, Eva and Jaroslav Drobnik (1993), “P rivatization and Liability for the Past Environmental
Damages,” mimeo, Institute for Environmental Policy, Prague, Czech Republic.
Goldenma n,  Gretta (1995), “Central European Approaches to Concerns About Environmenta l
Li ability  During and After Privatization,”  International Environment Reporter , Septembe r
6, 1995, pg. 696-701.
R oth schild, M. and Joseph Stiglitz (1970), “Increasing Risk I: A Definition,”  Journal of Economic
Theory , v. 2, pg. 225-243.
R othschild, M. and Joseph Stiglitz (1971), “Increasing Risk II: Its E conomic Consequences,”  Journal
of Economic Theory , v. 3, pg. 66-84.
Thomas,  Randall (1994), “The Impact of Environmental Liability on Privatization in Central an d
E astern Europe: A Case Study of Poland,”  University of Californi a Davis Law Review , v. 28,
pg. 165-217.
W or ld Bank / OECD (1992),  Corporate Survey on Western Direct Investment and Environmental
Issues in Central and Eastern Europe , Washington, DC: World Bank.Figure 1
Effect of Investor’s Information on Distribution of Cleanup Costs
Probability
High Information
Low Information
Level of
C min       ￿ Cmax Cleaup 
CostsFigure 2
Effect of Indemnification on Distribution of Cleanup Costs
Probability
High Indemnification
L ow Indemnification
Level of Cleanup Costs
       m ¢Cmin    m †Cmin                     m ¢￿             m †￿                          m ¢Cmax              m †Cmax